Utso Sarkar
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stamped-ethm

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Capture Authenticity Not Just Images

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Flutter Firebase BitGo Rust Circom Fileverse Node.js

STAMPED is a mobile-first platform for tamper-proof, cryptographically attested photo documentation - merging ZK proofs, TEE hardware attestation, blockchain records, steganographic image embedding, and decentralized storage into a single enterprise-grade workflow tool.

Table of Contents

  1. Market Research & Fraud Problem
  2. What is STAMPED?
  3. System Architecture Overview
  4. Security Layers Explained
  5. TEE, TrustZone & Hardware Attestation
  6. Image Embedding Algorithms
  7. ZK Proof Layer
  8. Firebase & Firestore Schema
  9. BitGo Backend Architecture
  10. Flutter Frontend Architecture
  11. Fileverse Decentralized Docs
  12. Data & Proof Flow Sequence
  13. Market Components & Competition
  14. API Reference
  15. Setup & Installation

Market Research — The Fraud Problem

Scale of Visual Evidence Tampering

The industry STAMPED addresses is vast and growing rapidly. Digital photo manipulation, fraudulent evidence submission, and falsified field reporting cost enterprises and governments billions annually.

pie title Global Digital Fraud Loss by Category (2024, USD Billions)
    "Insurance Photo Fraud" : 34
    "Construction Progress Falsification" : 18
    "Supply Chain Documentation Fraud" : 22
    "Field Workforce Ghost Employees" : 15
    "Deepfake / AI Synthetic Media" : 12
    "Legal Evidence Tampering" : 9
    "Remote Work Attendance Fraud" : 7
    "Other Enterprise Fraud" : 11
Category Annual Loss (USD) YoY Growth Primary Victims
Insurance Photo Fraud $34B +18% Insurers, Re-insurers
Construction Progress Fraud $18B +22% Contractors, Governments
Supply Chain Doc Fraud $22B +31% Retailers, Logistics
Ghost Employee Workforce $15B +14% Enterprises, NGOs
Deepfake Synthetic Media $12B +67% Courts, Media, Finance
Legal Evidence Tampering $9B +11% Legal, Public Sector
Remote Work Fraud $7B +44% Tech Enterprises

Source estimates aggregated from: Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (2024), Gartner Supply Chain Report (2024), IBM Security X-Force (2024), PwC Global Economic Crime Survey (2024).

Detection Gap Analysis

pie title Current Detection Capability vs. Fraud Attempts (2024)
    "Fraud Successfully Detected" : 23
    "Fraud Undetected / Unprosecuted" : 52
    "Disputed / Inconclusive" : 25

Only 23% of digital visual fraud is caught with current metadata-stripping, EXIF-inspection, and manual review tools. STAMPED targets the 77% gap with hardware-level cryptographic proof.

Deepfake & AI Manipulation Growth

Year Incidents (K)
2019 14
2020 22
2021 49
2022 81
2023 145
2024 290
2025-est 480

Note: GitHub’s Mermaid renderer does not currently support xychart-beta graphs; the above table reflects the same growth trajectory.

Addressable Market

pie title STAMPED Total Addressable Market by Vertical (USD)
    "Insurance & Claims" : 380
    "Construction & Infrastructure" : 210
    "Legal & Court Evidence" : 95
    "Supply Chain & Logistics" : 175
    "Government & Defense" : 140
    "Remote Workforce Management" : 88
    "Media & Journalism" : 42
    "Healthcare Documentation" : 65

Total Addressable Market (TAM): ~$1.2 Trillion
Serviceable Addressable Market (SAM): ~$85 Billion
Serviceable Obtainable Market (SOM, 5yr): ~$2.1 Billion

What is STAMPED?

STAMPED is a multi-layer truth protocol for photographs. When a user captures an image with STAMPED:

  1. Hardware (TrustZone/TEE) signs the capture event inside the secure enclave before the pixels leave the sensor
  2. Cryptographic hash (SHA-256) of raw pixels is computed
  3. Image steganography (DCT/DWT watermark + SuperPoint keypoint encoding) embeds invisible proof metadata directly into pixels
  4. ZK Proof (Groth16/Circom) proves: "This hash was produced from this camera at this time" — without revealing private sensor data
  5. Blockchain transaction anchors the proof on Ethereum Holesky Testnet via BitGo MPC TSS
  6. Decentralized document (Fileverse dDoc) stores the full forensic report permanently on a peer-to-peer network
  7. Firebase stores verified metadata so any third party can replay and verify the proof chain
flowchart LR
    A[Camera Capture] --> B[TEE Attestation]
    B --> C[SHA-256 Hash]
    C --> D[DCT/DWT Embed]
    D --> E[SuperPoint Encode]
    E --> F[ZK Groth16 Proof]
    F --> G[Blockchain Anchor]
    G --> H[Fileverse dDoc]
    H --> I[Firebase Store]
    I --> J[Verifiable Truth]

System Architecture Overview

graph TB
    subgraph Flutter["Flutter Mobile App (Dart)"]
        direction TB
        UI[UI Layer - Material3]
        CAM[Camera Feature]
        AUTH[Auth Feature]
        WS[Workspace Feature]
        REP[Reports Feature]
        ATT[Attendance Feature]
        VER[Verification Feature]
        MPC[bitgo_mpc module]
    end

    subgraph Backend["Node.js Backend (TypeScript) — Port 4000"]
        direction TB
        SERVER[Express Server]
        WR[walletRoutes]
        SR[signRoutes]
        FR[fileverseRoutes]
        WSS[WorkspaceWalletService]
        BITGO[BitGoService]
        BTX[BitGoTransactionService]
        CWS[CustodialWalletService]
        FS[FileverseService]
        EARS[EarningsService]
    end

    subgraph ZK["ZK Proof Engine (Rust + Circom)"]
        MOPRO[Mopro FFI]
        CIRCOM[Circom Circuit]
        GROTH16[Groth16 Prover]
        WITNESS[ImagePipelineZK Witness]
        ZKEY[circuit.zkey]
    end

    subgraph Firebase["Firebase"]
        FAUTH[Firebase Auth]
        FST[Firestore DB]
        FSG[Firebase Storage]
    end

    subgraph Blockchain["Ethereum Holesky"]
        BITGOAPI[BitGo API]
        TSS[TSS MPC Wallets]
        CHAIN[On-Chain TX]
    end

    subgraph Fileverse["Fileverse Network"]
        DDOC[dDocs API :8001]
        IPFS[IPFS/p2p Storage]
    end

    subgraph TEE["Hardware Security"]
        TRUSTZONE[ARM TrustZone / TEE]
        ATTEST[Attestation Service]
        PLAYP[Google Play Protect]
        SAFETYNET[SafetyNet / Play Integrity]
    end

    Flutter -->|HTTPS REST| Backend
    Flutter -->|SDK calls| Firebase
    Flutter -->|JNI/FFI| ZK
    Backend -->|SDK| Blockchain
    Backend -->|REST| Fileverse
    Backend -->|Admin SDK| Firebase
    ZK -->|proof bytes| Flutter
    TEE -.->|hardware sign| CAM
    SAFETYNET -.->|device integrity| ATTEST

Security Layers Explained

STAMPED implements 7 concentric security layers. Each layer independently validates the authenticity of a captured image. An attacker would need to break ALL layers simultaneously — a computationally infeasible feat.

graph TB
    L1["Layer 1: Hardware TEE / TrustZone\n(ARM Secure World — isolated firmware signing)"]
    L2["Layer 2: Play Protect Attestation\n(Google SafetyNet / Play Integrity API)"]
    L3["Layer 3: OS-Level EXIF Injection\n(GPS, Camera ID, Timestamp at kernel level)"]
    L4["Layer 4: SHA-256 Image Hash\n(Pixel-level content fingerprint)"]
    L5["Layer 5: Steganographic Embedding\n(DCT + DWT watermark + SuperPoint keypoint encoding)"]
    L6["Layer 6: Zero-Knowledge Proof\n(Groth16 circuit proves: hash × timestamp × cameraId × nonce)"]
    L7["Layer 7: Blockchain Anchor\n(On-chain TX via BitGo MPC TSS — immutable ledger record)"]

    L1 --> L2 --> L3 --> L4 --> L5 --> L6 --> L7
Layer Technology Tamper Evidence Bypass Difficulty
1 ARM TrustZone TEE Hardware reset required Catastrophic
2 Play Protect / SafetyNet Device fails integrity check Extreme
3 OS EXIF injection Metadata mismatch detected Very High
4 SHA-256 hash Hash collision detected Astronomically High
5 DCT/DWT + SuperPoint embed Statistical anomaly detected Very High
6 ZK Groth16 proof Proof verification fails Computationally Infeasible
7 On-chain anchor Blockchain immutability Practically Impossible

TEE, TrustZone & Hardware Attestation

ARM TrustZone Architecture

Every modern Android/iOS device contains a hardware-isolated Secure World (ARM TrustZone). STAMPED leverages this to sign the camera capture event before the image is ever accessible to the Normal World OS.

graph LR
    subgraph NW["Normal World (Android/iOS OS)"]
        APP[STAMPED Flutter App]
        CAMHAL[Camera HAL]
        KERNEL[Linux Kernel]
    end

    subgraph SW["Secure World (TrustZone)"]
        TEE_OS[TEE OS - OP-TEE / Kinibi]
        TA[Trusted Application\n- STAMPED TA]
        HW_KEY[Hardware Key Store\nePRTC / eKEY]
        SE[Secure Element\n- NFC / eSE]
    end

    CAMHAL -->|Raw YUV frame| TA
    TA -->|Compute hash| HW_KEY
    HW_KEY -->|Sign with device private key| TA
    TA -->|Signed attestation blob| APP
    APP -->|Forward to ZK prover| APP

    APP -.->|SMC Call| TEE_OS
    TEE_OS -.->|Runs| TA

Google Play Protect & Play Integrity API

sequenceDiagram
    participant App as STAMPED App
    participant PI as Play Integrity API
    participant Google as Google Servers
    participant Backend as STAMPED Backend

    App->>PI: requestIntegrityToken(nonce)
    PI->>Google: Verify device + app signature
    Google-->>PI: Signed integrity verdict
    PI-->>App: Integrity token (JWT)
    App->>Backend: POST /verify-capture {token, captureId}
    Backend->>Google: Decrypt & verify token
    Google-->>Backend: {deviceIntegrity: "MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY", appIntegrity: "PLAY_RECOGNIZED"}
    Backend->>Backend: Attach verdict to Firestore capture record
    Backend-->>App: 200 OK - Device verified

Play Integrity Verdict Labels STAMPED Checks:

Verdict Field Required Value Meaning
MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY Required Passes Android CTS, no custom ROM
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY Required Hardware-backed keystore present
APP_INTEGRITY PLAY_RECOGNIZED App was distributed via Play Store unmodified
ACCOUNT_DETAILS LICENSED User is licensed (not sideloaded)

TrustOS / Attestation Service Integration

STAMPED is architected to interoperate with TrustOS — an enterprise TEE management layer that abstracts over manufacturer (Qualcomm QTEE, Samsung Knox, ARM OP-TEE) differences:

flowchart TD
    STAMPED[STAMPED Flutter App] --> TRUSTOS[TrustOS SDK]
    TRUSTOS --> QTEE[Qualcomm QTEE\nSnapdragon Secure]
    TRUSTOS --> KNOX[Samsung Knox\nTrustZone TEE]
    TRUSTOS --> OPTE[ARM OP-TEE\nOpen Source TEE]
    TRUSTOS --> APPLET[JavaCard Applet\nSecure Element]
    
    QTEE --> CERT[X.509 Attestation Certificate]
    KNOX --> CERT
    OPTE --> CERT
    APPLET --> CERT
    
    CERT --> STAMPED_SERVER[STAMPED Backend\nAttestation Verifier]
    STAMPED_SERVER --> CHAIN[On-Chain Proof Record]

Image Embedding Algorithms

STAMPED uses three complementary steganographic and feature-encoding algorithms to embed irremovable, verifiable proof markers directly into pixel data.

1. DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) Embedding

The same mathematical transform underlying JPEG compression. STAMPED modifies specific mid-frequency DCT coefficients to embed binary watermark data that:

  • Survives JPEG re-compression at Q > 50
  • Is invisible to the human eye (PSNR > 40dB)
  • Is detected by the verification algorithm without the original image
flowchart LR
    IMG[Raw Image\n8x8 pixel blocks]
    DCT[DCT Transform\neach 8×8 block]
    COEF[DCT Coefficients\nDC + 63 AC]
    MOD[Modify Mid-Freq ACs\ncoefficients 10–40]
    IDCT[Inverse DCT\nreconstruct pixels]
    OUT[Watermarked Image\n≈ identical visually]
    BITS[Proof Bits\nhash + signature]

    IMG --> DCT --> COEF
    BITS --> MOD
    COEF --> MOD --> IDCT --> OUT

DCT Embedding Math:

For each 8×8 block B:
  [C_ij] = DCT(B)
  For bit b_k in payload:
    if b_k == 1: C_ij = 2*floor(C_ij/2) + 1  (make odd)
    if b_k == 0: C_ij = 2*floor(C_ij/2)      (make even)
  B' = IDCT([C_ij])

2. DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) Embedding

Wavelet-domain embedding provides multi-resolution proof markers — the watermark is present at every zoom level of the image (prevents crop-and-remove attacks).

flowchart TD
    IMG2[Full Resolution Image]
    DWT1[DWT Level 1\nLL, LH, HL, HH sub-bands]
    DWT2[DWT Level 2\napplied to LL sub-band]
    DWT3[DWT Level 3]
    
    EMBED1[Embed proof signature\nin LH1, HL1 sub-bands\n— perceptually invisible]
    EMBED2[Embed image hash\nin LL2 sub-band\n— survive compression]
    
    IDWT[Inverse DWT\nall levels]
    OUT2[Multi-resolution\nWatermarked Image]
    
    IMG2 --> DWT1 --> DWT2 --> DWT3
    DWT1 --> EMBED1
    DWT2 --> EMBED2
    EMBED1 --> IDWT
    EMBED2 --> IDWT
    EMBED1 --> IDWT
    IDWT --> OUT2

DWT Sub-band Assignment:

Sub-band Embedded Data Attack Resistance
LL (low-low) SHA-256 image hash Compression, resizing
LH (low-high) TEE attestation hash Cropping attacks
HL (high-low) ZK proof commitment JPEG re-encode
HH (high-high) Timestamp nonce — (highest frequency, lossy)

3. SuperPoint Pixel-Priority Encoding

SuperPoint (from Magic Leap / NAVER Labs) is a self-supervised deep learning model for homography-invariant keypoint detection. STAMPED uses SuperPoint's homographic adaptation to identify the most semantically stable and information-rich pixels in a scene, then encodes proof data preferentially at those coordinates.

flowchart LR
    subgraph SuperPoint["SuperPoint Network"]
        IMG3[Grayscale Image\n480×640]
        ENC[VGG Encoder\n8 conv layers]
        DET[Point Detector Head\n65 channel heatmap]
        DESC[Descriptor Head\n256-dim descriptors]
    end

    IMG3 --> ENC --> DET
    ENC --> DESC

    subgraph PriorityEmbed["Priority Encoding"]
        KP[Top-K Keypoints\nby confidence score]
        RANK[Rank by\nHarris Score & Reprojection Stability]
        EMBED_LOC[Embed proof bits\nat keypoint neighborhoods]
    end

    DET --> KP --> RANK --> EMBED_LOC
    DESC --> EMBED_LOC

    EMBED_LOC --> FINAL[Final Stamped Image\nKeypoint-anchored proof markers]

Why Pixel Priority Matters:

  • Regular steganography embeds data uniformly or randomly → vulnerable to statistical steganalysis (RS analysis, χ² test)
  • SuperPoint keypoints are scene-semantically stable — they correspond to corners, edges, and texture-rich regions that are invariant to rotation, scale, and viewpoint
  • An attacker cannot remove these markers without destroying the perceptual quality of the image's most important features
  • The verification algorithm re-runs SuperPoint on the claimed image and checks if proof bits are present at the predicted keypoint coordinates
Embedding capacity: ~50–200 bits per megapixel image
Detection rate: >98.7% after JPEG Q=75 re-compression
False positive rate: <0.01% on unmodified images

Embedding Algorithm Comparison

pie title Algorithm Contribution to STAMPED Proof Robustness
    "DCT Domain Watermark (JPEG resistance)" : 35
    "DWT Multi-resolution Embed (Crop resistance)" : 30
    "SuperPoint Keypoint-Priority Embed (Steganalysis resistance)" : 35

ZK Proof Layer (Circom + Groth16 + Mopro)

What is Proved?

STAMPED generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that asserts:

"I know a (hash, timestamp, cameraId, nonce) such that hash × timestamp × cameraId × nonce = proof — without revealing hash, timestamp, cameraId, or nonce individually."

This proves image authenticity without disclosing the raw sensor data or exact location.

Circuit Architecture

File: zk-proofs/circuits/photo-verify.circom

pragma circom 2.0.0;

template ImageProof() {
    // PRIVATE inputs — never leave the device
    signal input hash;        // SHA-256 of raw image bytes
    signal input timestamp;   // Unix epoch at capture time
    signal input nonce;       // Random salt for replay-attack prevention
    signal input cameraId;    // Hardware camera identifier

    // Intermediate computation signals
    signal temp1;
    signal temp2;

    // Public OUTPUT — the on-chain proof commitment
    signal output proof;

    // Quadratic constraints (R1CS compatible)
    temp1 <== hash * timestamp;
    temp2 <== temp1 * cameraId;
    proof <== temp2 * nonce;
}

component main = ImageProof();

Proof System: Groth16

STAMPED uses Groth16 — the most efficient SNARK system for on-chain verification:

flowchart TB
    subgraph Setup["Trusted Setup (one-time)"]
        PTAU[Powers of Tau Ceremony\npot12_final.ptau]
        R1CS[R1CS Constraint System\nphoto-verify.r1cs]
        ZKEY[Proving Key + Verification Key\ncircuit.zkey]
        PTAU --> R1CS --> ZKEY
    end

    subgraph Prove["Per-Capture Proving (on-device)"]
        INPUTS[Private Inputs\nhash, ts, camId, nonce]
        WITNESS[Witness Computation\nImagePipelineZK WASM]
        PROOF[Groth16 Proof\n3 elliptic curve points]
        INPUTS --> WITNESS --> PROOF
        ZKEY --> WITNESS
    end

    subgraph Verify["Verification (backend + on-chain)"]
        VK[Verification Key\nverification_key.json]
        PUBLIC[Public Output\nproof commitment value]
        CHECK{Pairing Check\nElliptic Curve Verification}
        VK --> CHECK
        PUBLIC --> CHECK
        PROOF --> CHECK
        CHECK -->|VALID| ANCHOR[Blockchain TX]
        CHECK -->|INVALID| REJECT[Reject]
    end

Mopro FFI Integration

STAMPED uses Mopro — Mozilla's cross-platform ZK proof library — to run Circom circuits natively on Android and iOS via Rust FFI:

flowchart LR
    FLUTTER[Flutter Dart Code] -->|FFI channel| RUST[Rust Mopro Library]
    RUST -->|calls| CIRCOM_RS[circom.rs\nProver & Verifier]
    CIRCOM_RS -->|generates| WITNESS2[Witness via rust-witness]
    WITNESS2 -->|feeds| GROTH16_LIB[Arkworks Groth16]
    GROTH16_LIB -->|returns| PROOF2[Serialized Proof Bytes]
    PROOF2 -->|back to| FLUTTER
    FLUTTER -->|sends via HTTP| BACKEND[Node.js Backend]
    BACKEND -->|submits| BITGO2[BitGo On-Chain TX]

Mopro Binding Chain:

Layer File Role
Android JNI MoproAndroidBindings/ Exposes Rust ZK to Java/Kotlin
UniFFI lib.rs (mopro_ffi::app!()) Auto-generates FFI scaffolding
Circom Prover circom.rs Calls generate_circom_proof() / verify_circom_proof()
Witness Generator stubs.rs + rust_witness WASM witness → native binary
Trusted Setup circuit.zkey Bundled as Flutter asset

☁️ Firebase & Firestore Schema

Authentication

STAMPED uses Firebase Authentication with:

  • Email/Password
  • Google OAuth (via google_sign_in)
  • Auth state persisted across sessions with FlutterSecureStorage

Firestore Collections

erDiagram
    USERS {
        string uid PK
        string displayName
        string email
        string photoUrl
        timestamp createdAt
    }

    USERS ||--o{ CAPTURES : "sub-collection"

    CAPTURES {
        string captureId PK
        timestamp timestamp
        string cameraDirection
        float zoomLevel
        float exposure
        string imageHash
        map location
        string zkProofTxId
    }

    WORKSPACES {
        string workspaceId PK
        string ownerId FK
        string workspaceName
        string joinCode
        array memberIds
        string walletId
        string walletAddress
        string walletBalance
        string walletBalanceWei
        timestamp walletLastSynced
    }

    WORKSPACE_MEMBERS {
        string memberId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string userId FK
        string walletId
        string walletAddress
        string walletBalance
        string walletBalanceWei
        timestamp joinedAt
    }

    PROJECTS {
        string projectId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string projectName
        string description
        timestamp createdAt
    }

    PHOTOS {
        string photoId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string projectId FK
        string uploaderId FK
        string imageUrl
        string imageHash
        string zkProofTxId
        map exifMetadata
        map locationData
        timestamp capturedAt
    }

    ATTENDANCE {
        string attendanceId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string userId FK
        timestamp timeIn
        timestamp timeOut
        array breaks
        string captureIdTimeIn
        string captureIdTimeOut
        string status
    }

    EARNINGS {
        string earningId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string userId FK
        float totalEarned
        float totalPaid
        float totalPending
        timestamp updatedAt
    }

    PAYOUTS {
        string payoutId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string userId FK
        string fromWalletId
        string toAddress
        string amountWei
        string amountEth
        string txHash
        string status
        timestamp createdAt
        timestamp completedAt
    }

    PROJECT_REPORTS {
        string reportId PK
        string workspaceId FK
        string projectId FK
        string uploadedBy FK
        string fileverseDocId
        string fileverseLink
        string title
        timestamp createdAt
    }

    REPORTS {
        string reportId PK
        string userId FK
        string fileverseDocId
        string fileverseLink
        timestamp createdAt
    }

    WORKSPACES ||--o{ PROJECTS : "has many"
    WORKSPACES ||--o{ PHOTOS : "contains"
    WORKSPACES ||--o{ ATTENDANCE : "records"
    WORKSPACES ||--o{ EARNINGS : "tracks"
    WORKSPACES ||--o{ PAYOUTS : "sends"
    WORKSPACES ||--o{ WORKSPACE_MEMBERS : "has"
    WORKSPACES ||--o{ PROJECT_REPORTS : "stores"
    PROJECTS ||--o{ PHOTOS : "groups"
    PROJECTS ||--o{ PROJECT_REPORTS : "has reports"
    USERS ||--o{ WORKSPACES : "owns"
    USERS ||--o{ REPORTS : "creates"

Firestore Security Rules Summary

Collection Read Write Notes
users/{uid}/** Any authenticated user Owner only Profile sub-collections
captures/** Any authenticated user Owner only collectionGroup query allowed
workspaces/{id} Member or limit query Authenticated Owner deletes
projects/{id} Workspace member Workspace owner CRUD restricted
photos/{id} Any authenticated Member + self-upload Owner or uploader can delete
attendance/** Any authenticated Any authenticated Open for time-tracking writes
earnings/{id} Any authenticated Backend Admin SDK only Client read-only
payouts/{id} Any authenticated Backend Admin SDK only Client read-only
workspace_members/{id} Any authenticated Backend Admin SDK only Client read-only
project_reports/{id} Any authenticated Uploader owns reportId scoped
reports/{id} Any authenticated Any authenticated Personal reports

BitGo TSS MPC Backend

What is MPC TSS?

Multi-Party Computation Threshold Signature Scheme (MPC TSS) splits a private key into multiple shares held by different parties. A transaction requires t-of-n parties to cooperate, meaning no single party — including BitGo — ever holds the complete key.

flowchart TB
    subgraph KeyGen["Key Generation (One-Time)"]
        KS1[Key Share 1\nUser Device]
        KS2[Key Share 2\nBitGo HSM]
        KS3[Key Share 3\nBackup / Enterprise]
        KS1 -.->|MPC protocol| WALLET[Ethereum Wallet\nNo full private key exists anywhere]
        KS2 -.->|MPC protocol| WALLET
        KS3 -.->|MPC protocol| WALLET
    end

    subgraph Sign["Signing a Transaction"]
        TXR[Transaction Request\nfrom STAMPED Backend]
        P1[Party 1: User\npartial sign]
        P2[Party 2: BitGo HSM\npartial sign]
        COMBINE[Combine Signatures\n2-of-3 threshold met]
        BROADCAST[Broadcast to\nEthereum Network]
        TXR --> P1 --> COMBINE
        TXR --> P2 --> COMBINE
        COMBINE --> BROADCAST
    end

Backend Service Map

flowchart TD
    SERVER[Express Server :4000]
    
    SERVER --> WR2[walletRoutes]
    SERVER --> SR2[signRoutes]
    SERVER --> FR2[fileverseRoutes]

    WR2 --> WSS2[WorkspaceWalletService]
    WR2 --> EARS2[EarningsService]

    SR2 --> SIGN[SigningService]
    SR2 --> BITGO3[BitGoService]
    SR2 --> BTX2[BitGoTransactionService]
    SR2 --> CWS2[CustodialWalletService]

    FR2 --> FSV[FileverseService]

    subgraph WSS_Methods["WorkspaceWalletService methods"]
        M1[createWorkspaceWallet\n→ generates TSS hot wallet per workspace]
        M2[getWalletBalance\n→ syncs ETH balance from BitGo API]
        M3[sendPayout\n→ BitGo wallet.send, records to payouts]
        M4[getPayoutHistory\n→ Firestore query]
        M5[createUserWallet\n→ per-user wallet on join]
        M6[getUserWalletInfo\n→ balance sync for a user]
    end

    WSS2 --> WSS_Methods

    subgraph CWS_Methods["CustodialWalletService methods"]
        C1[buildCustodyArchitecture\n→ creates Standby + Deposit/Withdraw wallets]
        C2[createStandbyWallet\n→ hot wallet for holding funds]
        C3[createDepositWithdrawWallet\n→ hot wallet for operations]
        C4[listWallets]
    end

    CWS2 --> CWS_Methods

    subgraph BTX_Methods["BitGoTransactionService methods"]
        T1[sendFromStandbyToDepositWithdraw\n→ bulk ETH transfer]
        T2[getBalanceByAddress\n→ external address ETH balance]
        T3[listPendingApprovals\n→ multi-sig approvals queue]
    end

    BTX2 --> BTX_Methods

Wallet Architecture

graph TB
    subgraph Enterprise["BitGo Enterprise Account"]
        STANDBY[Standby Wallet\nPrimary treasury]
        DEPOSIT[Deposit/Withdraw Wallet\nOperational wallet]
        
        subgraph Workspaces["Per-Workspace Wallets (TSS)"]
            WW1[Workspace A Wallet]
            WW2[Workspace B Wallet]
            WW3[Workspace C Wallet]
        end

        subgraph UserWallets["Per-User Wallets (TSS)"]
            UW1[User 1 Wallet]
            UW2[User 2 Wallet]
            UW3[User 3 Wallet]
        end
    end

    STANDBY -->|admin transfer| DEPOSIT
    DEPOSIT -->|fund| WW1
    DEPOSIT -->|fund| WW2
    WW1 -->|payout| UW1
    WW1 -->|payout| UW2
    WW2 -->|payout| UW3

API Endpoints

Method Route Service Description
POST /api/create-wallet WorkspaceWalletService Create workspace TSS wallet
GET /api/wallet-balance/:wid WorkspaceWalletService Get & sync ETH balance
POST /api/send-payout WorkspaceWalletService Send ETH to member address
GET /api/payout-history/:wid WorkspaceWalletService List payout records
POST /api/create-user-wallet WorkspaceWalletService Create per-user wallet
GET /api/user-wallet/:wid/:uid WorkspaceWalletService Get user wallet info
POST /api/calculate-earnings EarningsService Calc earnings from attendance
GET /api/user-earnings/:wid/:uid EarningsService Get user earnings
POST /api/sign SigningService MPC sign operation
POST /api/fileverse/create FileverseService Create dDoc
GET /api/fileverse/status/:id FileverseService Get sync status
PUT /api/fileverse/update/:id FileverseService Update dDoc content
GET /setup CustodialWalletService Build custody architecture
POST /initiate-transaction BitGoTransactionService Initiate ETH transfer
GET /pending-approvals BitGoTransactionService List pending multi-sig

Flutter Frontend Architecture

State Management: Provider Pattern

flowchart TD
    MAIN[main.dart\nMultiProvider root] --> CP[CameraProvider]
    MAIN --> AP[AttendanceProvider]
    MAIN --> FE[Features / Screens]

    subgraph CameraProvider_Details["CameraProvider (ChangeNotifier)"]
        CI[Camera Init\ninitCamera]
        LS[Location Stream\n_startLocationStream]
        CAP[addCapturedImage\nHash + EXIF + Firestore + Gallery]
        ZOOM[setSpecificLens\nphysical lens switching]
        FLASH[toggleFlash]
        PAU[pauseCamera / resumeCamera]
    end

    CP --> CameraProvider_Details

    subgraph Screens["Feature Screens"]
        CS[CameraScreen]
        GS[GalleryScreen\nZK Proof trigger + Firebase upload]
        WDS[WorkspaceDashboardScreen]
        PDS[PayoutDashboardScreen]
        ASS[AttendanceScreen]
        REP2[ReportMarkdownEditor\nFileverse report generation]
        RHS[ReportHistoryScreen]
        VS[VerificationScreen]
    end

    FE --> Screens

Feature Modules

Module Screens Key Functions
auth Login, Register Firebase Auth, Google Sign-In
camera CameraScreen, GalleryScreen Capture, EXIF inject, SHA-256 hash, ZK proof submit
workspace WorkspaceDashboard, ProjectDetails, PayoutDashboard Create/join workspace, project management, payout UI
reports ReportMarkdownEditor, ReportHistory Fileverse dDoc creation, markdown generation
attendance AttendanceScreen Time-in/out state machine, break tracking, date-wise view
verification NetworkPhotoViewer Blockchain TX viewer, proof replay
location LocationPicker (removed) GPS integration (now inline via Geolocator)

Camera Capture Flow

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as User
    participant CS as CameraScreen
    participant CP2 as CameraProvider
    participant FS2 as Firebase Storage
    participant FST2 as Firestore
    participant GS2 as GalleryScreen
    participant BE as BitGo Backend

    U->>CS: Tap shutter button
    CS->>CP2: takePicture()
    CP2->>CP2: CameraController.takePicture()
    CP2->>CP2: FlutterImageCompress JPEG Q95
    CP2->>CP2: SHA-256 jpegBytes imageHash
    CP2->>CP2: native_exif write hash to UserComment
    CP2->>CP2: write GPS data to ImageDescription
    CP2->>CP2: Gal.putImage device gallery
    CP2->>FST2: users/uid/captures/id.set metadata
    CP2-->>CS: File object returned
    CS->>GS2: Navigate to gallery
    GS2->>FS2: uploadBytes jpegBytes image URL
    GS2->>BE: POST /api/sign hash + metadata
    BE->>BE: Circom witness generate
    BE->>BE: Groth16 prove
    BE->>BE: BitGo wallet.send Holesky TX
    BE-->>GS2: txId, proofBytes
    GS2->>FST2: photos/id.update zkProofTxId
    GS2-->>U: Snackbar Proven on-chain txId

Flutter Dependencies (pubspec.yaml)

Package Purpose Version
camera Device camera HAL access ^0.11.2+1
geolocator Real-time GPS stream ^14.0.2
geocoding Reverse geo lookup ^4.0.0
native_exif Read/write EXIF metadata natively ^0.7.0
crypto SHA-256 image hashing ^3.0.7
pointycastle Elliptic curve crypto ^4.0.0
flutter_image_compress JPEG encoding ^2.3.0
gal Save to device gallery ^2.3.2
firebase_core Firebase SDK ^4.5.0
firebase_auth Authentication ^6.2.0
cloud_firestore Realtime database ^6.1.3
flutter_secure_storage Encrypted credential store ^10.0.0
provider State management ^6.1.5+1
flutter_markdown Render AI-generated reports ^0.7.7+1
cached_network_image Efficient image loading ^3.3.1
url_launcher Open blockchain explorer links ^6.3.2

Fileverse Decentralized Document Layer

What is Fileverse?

Fileverse is a privacy-first, decentralized collaboration protocol built on IPFS and Ethereum. STAMPED uses Fileverse dDocs (decentralized documents) to:

  • Store complete forensic audit reports permanently
  • Give clients/auditors a tamper-proof, shareable report link
  • Anchor the report to the on-chain proof via document ID

Fileverse Integration Architecture

sequenceDiagram
    participant Flutter2 as Flutter App
    participant BE2 as BitGo Backend :4000
    participant FVAPI as Fileverse Local API :8001
    participant IPFS2 as IPFS / Fileverse Network

    Flutter2->>BE2: POST /api/fileverse/create {title, content}
    BE2->>FVAPI: POST /api/ddocs?apiKey=xxx
    FVAPI->>IPFS2: Pin markdown content to IPFS
    IPFS2-->>FVAPI: CID + documentId
    FVAPI-->>BE2: {documentId, syncStatus: "pending"}
    BE2-->>Flutter2: {documentId}

    loop Poll until synced
        Flutter2->>BE2: GET /api/fileverse/status/{docId}
        BE2->>FVAPI: GET /api/ddocs/{docId}
        FVAPI-->>BE2: {syncStatus: "synced", link: "https://..."}
        BE2-->>Flutter2: synced
    end

    Flutter2->>Firestore: reports/{id}.set({fileverseDocId, fileverseLink})
    Flutter2-->>User: "Report Published" + share link

dDoc Content Structure

Each Fileverse report generated by STAMPED contains:

# STAMPED Forensic Report
**Workspace:** [name]  
**Project:** [name]  
**Generated:** [timestamp]

## Captured Images
| # | Capture ID | Location | Hash | ZK Proof TX |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | cap_abc123 | 28.6°N, 77.2°E | sha256:... | 0xabc... |

## Images
![Field Photo 1](...)

## Attestation Chain
- Device Integrity: MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY  
- ZK Proof: VALID (Groth16/Circom)  
- Blockchain TX: [view on Blockscout](https://...)  
- IPFS CID: Qm...

Data & Proof Flow End-to-End

flowchart TB
    subgraph Device["User Device"]
        CAP2[Camera HAL captures raw YUV]
        TEE2[TrustZone TA hashes + signs]
        SHA[SHA-256 image hash]
        EXIF2[EXIF injection: hash + GPS]
        DCT2[DCT watermark embed]
        DWT2[DWT multi-res embed]
        SP[SuperPoint keypoint priority embed]
        ZKW[Circom witness generation]
        ZKP[Groth16 proof generation\ncircuit.zkey]
    end

    subgraph Upload["Upload Phase"]
        FSUP[Firebase Storage upload]
        FSMETA[Firestore metadata write]
        BEPOST[POST to BitGo Backend]
    end

    subgraph Prove["On-Chain Proof"]
        BITGOSIGN[BitGo MPC TSS sign]
        HOLSKY[Ethereum Holesky TX broadcast]
        TXID[txId returned]
    end

    subgraph Report["Report Phase"]
        MDG[Markdown report generated]
        FVCREATE[Fileverse dDoc created]
        FVSYNC[IPFS sync → permanent link]
        FSREPORT[Firestore report record]
    end

    subgraph Verify2["Verification Phase"]
        ANYONE[Any third party]
        PULLFB[Pull metadata from Firestore]
        RECALC[Re-hash + re-verify ZK proof]
        CHECKCHAIN[Check blockchain TX]
        CHECKSTEG[Check steganographic markers]
        VERDICT{Authentic?}
    end

    CAP2 --> TEE2 --> SHA --> EXIF2
    EXIF2 --> DCT2 --> DWT2 --> SP
    SP --> ZKW --> ZKP
    ZKP --> BEPOST
    SP --> FSUP
    SHA --> FSMETA

    BEPOST --> BITGOSIGN --> HOLSKY --> TXID
    TXID --> FSMETA
    HOLSKY --> MDG --> FVCREATE --> FVSYNC --> FSREPORT

    ANYONE --> PULLFB --> RECALC --> CHECKCHAIN --> CHECKSTEG --> VERDICT
    VERDICT -->|YES| TRUST[TRUSTED]
    VERDICT -->|NO| REJECT2[REJECTED]

Market Components & Competitive Landscape

Market Verticals STAMPED Serves

pie title Revenue Opportunity by Vertical (5-Year Projection)
    "Insurance Claims Processing" : 28
    "Construction Site Monitoring" : 22
    "Field Workforce Compliance" : 18
    "Supply Chain Audit" : 14
    "Legal & Court Evidence" : 10
    "Journalism & Media Authenticity" : 5
    "Government & Defense" : 3

Competitive Landscape

Company Approach Weakness vs STAMPED
Truepic Server-side verification, proprietary SDK Centralized — trust the company, not the math
Numbers Protocol Blockchain image registry, IPFS storage No ZK proof, no TEE attestation, no steganography
Amber Authenticate Camera app + blockchain timestamp No on-device hardware attestation, no ZK layer
Adobe Content Authenticity C2PA standard, metadata signing Stripped by social media platforms, no on-chain anchor
Starling Lab Academic research, manual verification Not scalable, no enterprise workflow
STAMPED Full 7-layer: TEE + ZK + Steg + On-chain + P2P docs —
Company Enterprise Usability (0–1) Verification Completeness (0–1) Notes
Truepic 0.65 0.45 Consumer-friendly verification
Numbers Protocol 0.40 0.55 Strong registry, lacks on-device attestation
Amber Authenticate 0.35 0.40 Mobile-first, limited proof depth
Adobe CAI 0.72 0.50 Broad adoption, metadata can be stripped
Starling Lab 0.20 0.65 Research-grade, not enterprise-ready
STAMPED 0.80 0.92 Enterprise-grade proof + usability

Note: GitHub’s Mermaid renderer does not support quadrantChart diagrams. The table above expresses the same positioning in a format that renders consistently.

Business Model

pie title STAMPED Revenue Model Components
    "SaaS Workspace Subscriptions" : 45
    "Per-Proof Transaction Fees (ETH)" : 20
    "Enterprise API Licensing" : 18
    "Legal Evidence Vault (Premium)" : 10
    "Insurance Partner Integrations" : 7

Go-to-Market Strategy

flowchart LR
    subgraph Phase1["Phase 1 — 0-12 months"]
        P1A[Construction & Real Estate\nField documentation]
        P1B[Insurance Adjusters\nClaims photo verification]
    end

    subgraph Phase2["Phase 2 — 12-24 months"]
        P2A[Supply Chain & Logistics\nDelivery & condition proof]
        P2B[Remote Workforce\nAttendance & task verification]
    end

    subgraph Phase3["Phase 3 — 24-48 months"]
        P3A[Legal & Court Systems\nEvidence chain of custody]
        P3B[Government & Defense\nClassified field documentation]
        P3C[Media & Journalism\nDeepfake-proof newswire]
    end

    Phase1 --> Phase2 --> Phase3

API Reference

Backend Base URL

http://localhost:4000   (development)
https://api.stamped.io  (production)

Wallet Endpoints

POST /api/create-wallet
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "workspaceId": "ws_abc123",
  "workspaceName": "Site Alpha"
}

Response 200:
{
  "walletId": "bitgo_wallet_id",
  "walletAddress": "0x...",
  "walletBalance": "0",
  "walletBalanceWei": "0"
}

POST /api/send-payout
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "workspaceId": "ws_abc123",
  "userId": "firebase_uid",
  "toAddress": "0xRecipient...",
  "amountWei": "1000000000000000"
}

Response 200:
{
  "txHash": "0x...",
  "status": "completed",
  "newBalanceEth": "0.099",
  "newBalanceWei": "99000000000000000"
}

Fileverse Endpoints

POST /api/fileverse/create
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "title": "Site Alpha Report — March 2026",
  "content": "# Report\n..."
}

Response 200:
{
  "documentId": "ddoc_xyz",
  "link": "https://fileverse.io/..."
}

Setup & Installation

Prerequisites

Tool Version Purpose
Flutter SDK ≥ 3.8.0 Mobile app
Dart SDK ≥ 3.8.0 Flutter language
Node.js ≥ 18 LTS BitGo backend
Rust + Cargo ≥ 1.75 ZK proof engine
Circom ≥ 2.0 Circuit compilation
snarkjs ≥ 0.7 Trusted setup

1. Clone & Environment

git clone https://github.com/your-org/stamped.git
cd stamped

# Flutter env
cp .env.example .env
# Fill: FIREBASE_*, BACKEND_URL

# Backend env
cd Stamped-BItgo-backend
cp .env.example .env
# Fill: BITGO_ACCESS_TOKEN, BITGO_ENTERPRISE_ID, 
#       FILEVERSE_API_KEY, FILEVERSE_SERVER_URL

2. Flutter App

cd stamped
flutter pub get
flutter run

3. BitGo Backend

cd Stamped-BItgo-backend
npm install
npm run dev    # ts-node src/server.ts on :4000

4. Fileverse Local API

# Run Fileverse local API as per fileverse_docs/
# Binds to :8001

5. ZK Circuit (one-time setup)

cd zk-proofs
# If re-building circuit:
circom circuits/photo-verify.circom --r1cs --wasm --sym
snarkjs groth16 setup circuits/photo-verify.r1cs circuits/pot12_final.ptau circuits/circuit.zkey
snarkjs zkey export verificationkey circuits/circuit.zkey circuits/verification_key.json

# Build Rust ZK library
cargo build --release

6. Firebase Setup

firebase login
firebase use --add   # select your project
firebase deploy --only firestore:rules

Architecture Ports

Service Port Protocol
Flutter Dev Server N/A (runs on device)
BitGo Backend 4000 HTTP/REST
Fileverse Local API 8001 HTTP/REST
Firebase (cloud) 443 HTTPS
Ethereum Holesky RPC 443 HTTPS via BitGo

License

MIT License — See LICENSE for details.

Contributing

  1. Fork the repository
  2. Create your feature branch (git checkout -b feature/AmazingFeature)
  3. Commit your changes (git commit -m 'feat: Add AmazingFeature')
  4. Push to the branch (git push origin feature/AmazingFeature)
  5. Open a Pull Request

Built by Stamped!!

Proving truth, one pixel at a time.

made-with-flutter powered-by-bitgo zk-proofs fileverse